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A quitting game is a sequential game where each player has two actions: to continue
or to quit. The game terminates once at least one player quits. The payoﬀ depends on
the subset of players who quit at the termination stage, and is 0 if no one ever quits.
For every continuation payoﬀ x we assign a one-shot game, where the payoﬀ if
everyone continues is x. We study the dynamics of the correspondence that assigns to
every continuation payoﬀ the set of equilibrium payoﬀs in the corresponding one-shot
game.
The study presented here has an implication on the approach one should take in
trying to prove, or disprove, the existence of an equilibrium payoﬀ in n-player stochastic
games. It also shows that the minimal length of the period of a periodic δ-equilibrium
in 3-player quitting games needs not be uniformly bounded for δ > 0.
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11 Introduction
Whether or not any n-player undiscounted stochastic game admits a uniform equilibrium
payoﬀ is still an open problem, even though a lot of progress was achieved in recent years.
Mertens and Neyman (1981) proved the existence of the value in zero-sum games. Existence
of an equilibrium payoﬀ was proved by Vrieze and Thuijsman (1989) for two-player non
zero-sum absorbing games,1 by Vieille (2000) for two-player stochastic games, and by Solan
(1999) for three-player absorbing games.
In all of these existence proofs one approximates the game by a sequence of auxiliary
games that admit a stationary equilibrium. By studying the asymptotic behavior of a se-
quence of stationary equilibria in the auxiliary game, as the approximation becomes better,
one constructs an equilibrium payoﬀ in the original undiscounted game.
Flesch et al (1997) studied an example of a three-player quitting game,2 that admits no
stationary -equilibrium, and the only equilibria in this game have a periodic ﬂavor. As
it turns out, periodic equilibria are a very useful concept, that helped solving a couple of
classes of stochastic games. It was used in Solan’s (1999) study of three-player absorbing
games, and in Solan and Vieille’s (1998) study of quitting games.
Solan and Vieille (1998) studied an example of a four-player quitting game where the
approximation technique fails. Nevertheless, they have succeeded to prove that a class of
n-player quitting games admits an equilibrium payoﬀ using the following technique. With
every vector x ∈ R
n associate the one-shot game G(x) with continuation payoﬀ x; that
is, if everyone continues, the payoﬀ is given by x. For every  > 0 let E(x) be the set of
all -equilibrium payoﬀs in G(x), where the corresponding -equilibrium strategy proﬁle is
terminating with probability at least ; that is, the probability that everyone continues is
smaller than 1 − . Solan and Vieille proved that, given any periodic point of E, one can
construct an 1/6-equilibrium in the original quitting game. They also found conditions on
1Absorbing games are stochastic games where all states but one are absorbing.
2Quitting games are absorbing games where each player has two possible actions, to continue or to quit,
and the game is absorbed with probability 1 once at least one player quits.
2the payoﬀ function that ensure that such a periodic point exists.
Since the method of approximating games is seemingly not powerful enough to deal with
general n-player stochastic games, one needs to develop new techniques, and the approach
used in Solan and Vieille (1998) may serve as a starting point.
In the present note we restrict ourselves to quitting games, and we study the dynamics
of the correspondence E0; that is, the correspondence that assigns to every vector x ∈ Rn
the set of equilibrium payoﬀs in the one shot game with continuation payoﬀ x.
If x is large enough (that is, xi is large for every i), then the proﬁle “everyone continues”
is an equilibrium in G(x), and therefore x is a ﬁxed point of E0. Nevertheless, the proﬁle
“everyone continues” needs not be an equilibrium in the original quitting game.
A sequence x1,x2,...,xK = x1 of vectors in Rn is a period of E0 if xk ∈ E0(xk+1) for
every k = 1,2,...,K (addition modulo K). It is a non trivial period if for at least one index
k, in the equilibrium strategy proﬁle in G(xk+1) that yields payoﬀ xk at least one player quits
with positive probability. It is easy to verify that every non trivial period of E0 corresponds
to an equilibrium in the quitting game. Thus, if one’s goal is equilibrium payoﬀs in the
original quitting game, one should look for non trivial periods of E0.
More generally, one should look for non trivial inverse iterates; that is, sequences (xk)k∈N
such that (i) xk ∈ E0(xk+1) for every k ∈ N, and (ii) if for every k ∈ N αk is an equilibrium
strategy proﬁle in G(xk+1) that yields payoﬀ xk, then the strategy proﬁle (αk)k∈N in the
original quitting game is terminating with probability 1.
We show, by studying an example of a three-player quitting game, that the correspon-
dence E0 needs not have non-trivial inverse iterates, even when the game admits an equi-
librium payoﬀ. In particular, it follows that three-player quitting games do not necessarily
admit 0-equilibria.
This result shows that a simpler technique than the one used in Solan and Vieille (1998),
namely, the search for a non trivial periodic point of E0, is bound to fail. Thus, the result
is useful both for those who try to prove that every stochastic game admits an equilibrium
payoﬀ, as well as for those who look for a counter example. For the ﬁrst group it says
3that looking for non-trivial periods of the correspondence E0 is probably not the right path,
whereas for the second group it says that even if E0 does not have a non trivial period, the
game may still admit a uniform equilibrium payoﬀ.
Our result also complements that of Solan (1999, 2000). Solan (1999) proves that every
three-player absorbing game admits a δ-equilibrium where the equilibrium path is periodic,
and Solan (2000) proves that every absorbing team game3 admits a δ-equilibrium where the
equilibrium path is periodic, and the length of the period is 1 or 2. Our example shows that
in three-player absorbing games the length of the period cannot be uniformly bounded (even
if payoﬀs are bounded).
2 The Example
For every  ≥ 0, let G be a three-player quitting game with the following payoﬀ matrix:
Q
C




1 + ,0,1 ∗
0,1,3 ∗
0,1,1 +  ∗
3,0,1 ∗
0,0,0 ∗
1,1 + ,0 ∗
Figure 1
An asterisked entry is absorbing with probability 1, and the non-asterisked entry is
absorbing with probability 0.
The game G is a perturbation of the game G0, which was studied by Flesch et al (1997).
A strategy for player i in G is a sequence (αi
k)k∈N, where αi
k is the probability that
player i quits at stage k, provided the game has not terminated before. A strategy proﬁle is
a vector of strategies, one for each player.
For every continuation payoﬀ y ∈ R3, let G(y) be the one-shot game derived from G
with a continuation payoﬀ y; that is, a one-shot game where each player has two possible
3A team game is a game where the set of players is divided into two subsets, and the payoﬀs of players
in the same subset coincide.
4actions, to continue or to quit, the payoﬀ if everyone continues is y, and all other payoﬀs are
as appears in Figure 1. Let E(y) be the set of all Nash equilibria of the game G(y).4
A mixed strategy for player i in G(y) is represented by a number αi ∈ [0,1], which is
the probability that player i quits. A mixed strategy proﬁle is a vector α = (αi)3
i=1 ∈ [0,1]3.
A sequence (y(k),α(k))k∈N where for every k ∈ N, y(k) ∈ R3 and α(k) ∈ [0,1]3 is
admissible in G if for every k ∈ N, α(k) is an equilibrium in the game G(y(k + 1)) that





i=1(1 − αi(k)) = 0.
Let
F = {y ∈ R
3 | There is an admissible sequence for y in G}.
In words, F is the set of all vectors in R3 that are the ﬁrst element in some inverse iterate
of E. By deﬁnition, if (y(k),α(k))k∈N is an admissible sequence in G then y(k) ∈ F for
every k ∈ N. Note that there may be several admissible sequences in G for the same vector
y ∈ R3.
A vector y ∈ F is trivial (in G) if every corresponding admissible sequence is not




i=1(1 − αi(k)) > 0.
One can verify that for every  > 0, any vector y ∈ (1 + ,∞)3 is trivial in G. Indeed,
such a y is in E(x) if and only if x = y, and the corresponding equilibrium is α = (0,0,0).
It is clear that every non-trivial vector y ∈ F corresponds to (at least one) equilibrium
in G; if (y(k),α(k))k∈N is a completely absorbing admissible sequence for y in G, then
the strategy proﬁle (α(k))k∈N is an equilibrium in G, and y = y(1) is the corresponding
equilibrium payoﬀ.
Recalling the notion of equilibrium payoﬀ (see, e.g., Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994,
Section VII.4)), one can provide a stronger deﬁnition for trivial vectors: a vector y ∈ F is
trivial if there exists δ > 0 such that every admissible sequence (y(k),α(k))k∈N for y in G






i=1(1 − αi(k)) > δ. The results remain valid with this stronger deﬁnition.
However, since it is not clear whether an analogue of Lemma 3.2 below is still valid, the
proofs of the theorems is more involved.
Our ﬁrst result is:
Theorem 2.1 For every  > 0 suﬃciently small, F contains only trivial vectors.
Recall that by Solan (1999), the game G admits a uniform equilibrium payoﬀ. Thus, even
if the game admits an equilibrium payoﬀ, E needs not have a non trivial inverse iterate.
In all the classes of non zero-sum stochastic games where the existence of an equilibrium
payoﬀ was proven, one can ﬁnd δ-equilibrium strategy proﬁles where the equilibrium path
is periodic. For absorbing team games one can even ﬁnd δ-equilibria where the length of
the period is bounded by 2 (see Solan (2000)). It is therefore natural to ask whether the
minimal length of the period can be uniformly bounded in other classes of stochastic games
as well. As our second theorem claims, this is not the case in three-player quitting games.
For every  > 0 and every δ > 0, let d(,δ) be the minimal period of a periodic δ-
equilibrium of G.
Theorem 2.2 For every  > 0 suﬃciently small, liminfδ→0 d(,δ) = +∞.
Since the proof of Theorem 2.2 is similar in spirit to that of Theorem 2.1, we only provide
a rough sketch for it.
3 Analysis
Flesch et al (1997) studied the game G0. The following Lemma summarizes several of their
results that are used below.
Lemma 3.1 Let (y(k),α(k))k∈N be an admissible sequence (not necessarily completely ab-
sorbing) in G0. Then
1. If αi(k) ∈ (0,1) for each i = 1,2,3 then mini{yi(k + 1)} < mini{yi(k)}.
62. There is k ∈ N such that either α1(k) = 0, or α2(k) = 0, or α3(k) = 0.
3. If αi(k) = 0 for some i = 1,2,3 then there exists j 6= i such that αj(k) = 0 as well.
Moreover,
4. For every δ > 0 suﬃciently small, the game G0 does not admit any stationary δ-
equilibrium.
Lemma 3.2 If (y(k),α(k))k∈N is a completely absorbing admissible sequence in G, then for
every n ∈ N, the sequence (y(k),α(k))∞
k=n is a completely absorbing admissible sequence for
y(k), provided  is suﬃciently small.
Proof: By deﬁnition, (y(k),α(k))∞
k=n is an admissible sequence for y(k). Since (y(k),α(k))k∈N
is completely absorbing, it is suﬃcient to prove that αi(k) < 1 for every i = 1,2,3 and every
k ∈ N. Assume to the contrary that αi(k) = 1 for some i,k. Then α(k) is a 3-equilibrium
in G, hence a 4-equilibrium in G0, which contradicts Lemma 3.1(4) if  is suﬃciently small.
The following two lemmas are easy. The ﬁrst is a simple matter of continuity, while the
second follows from the payoﬀ matrix in Figure 1.
Lemma 3.3 Let (n,xn,yn,αn)n∈N be a sequence such that (i) n ∈ (0,1), xn,yn ∈ R3, αn ∈
[0,1]3 for every n ∈ N, (ii) the limits x = limn→∞ xn, y = limn→∞ yn and α = limn→∞ αn
exist, while limn→∞ n = 0, and (iii) for every n ∈ N, αn is an equilibrium in Gn(xn) that
yields payoﬀ yn. Then α is an equilibrium in G0(x) that yields payoﬀ y.
Lemma 3.4 Let x,y ∈ R3,  ∈ [0,1) and α be an equilibrium in G(x) that yields payoﬀ y.
If αi > 0 for every i = 1,2,3 then yi < 1 +  for every i = 1,2,3.
Lemma 3.5 If x < (1,1,1) then for every  ∈ (0,1/3) and every y ∈ E(x), y < (1,1,1).
7Proof: Assume to the contrary that the lemma is not true, and let x,y ∈ R3 and  ∈ (0,1/3)
satisfy (i) x < (1,1,1), (ii) y ∈ E(x), and (iii) y1 ≥ 1. Let α ∈ [0,1]3 be an equilibrium in
G(x) that yields payoﬀ y.
Since xi < 1 for every i = 1,2,3, it cannot be the case that at most two players quit with
positive probability under α. Indeed, if a single player i quits with positive probability, this
player expects to receive xi < 1 by continuing and 1 by quitting. If two players quit with
positive probability, say players i and i + 1 mod 3, then player i expects to receive at least
1 by quitting, and less than 1 by continuing.












Since x1 < 1 and  > 0 the left hand-side equality implies that 1−α2+2α3−α2α3 > 1−α3,
while the right hand-side inequality implies that α2(1 − α3) ≥ α3. These two inequalities
imply that 3α3/(1 + α3) > α2 ≥ α3/(1 − α3), and therefore 1/3 >  > (1 − α3) >
(1 + α3)/3 > 1/3, a contradiction.
Note that if y ∈ F is not trivial, then y is in the convex hull of the payoﬀs in the entries




i ≤ 4 and 0 ≤ y
i ≤ 3 ∀i. (1)
Let F be the limit set of all non trivial vectors in F. That is,
F = {y ∈ R
3 | y = lim
n→∞yn,yn ∈ Fn is non trivial,n → 0}.
To prove Theorem 2.1, it is suﬃcient to prove that F = ∅. Note that by (1), for every
y ∈ F,
P3
i=1 yi ≤ 4, and 0 ≤ yi ≤ 3 for each i = 1,2,3.
Deﬁne ∆ =
n
y ∈ R3 |
P3
i=1 yi = 4
o
. Our next goal is to prove:
5Actually, for every  ≥ 0, the stationary strategy αi = 1/2 guarantees player i an expected payoﬀ 1/2.
It follows that the max-min value of each player is at least 1/2. In particular yi ≥ 1/2 for every player i and
every non-trivial vector.
8Lemma 3.6 F ⊆ ∆.
Proof: Assume to the contrary that there is y ∈ F such that
P3
i=1 yi < 4 − 4ρ, for some
ρ > 0.
Let yn → y be a sequence such that yn ∈ Fn is non trivial and n → 0. For every n ∈ N,
let (yn(k),αn(k))k∈N be a completely absorbing admissible sequence for yn in Gn. By taking
a subsequence, assume w.l.o.g. that
P3
i=1 yi
n < 4 − 4ρ for every n ∈ N.
We ﬁrst claim that if y is chosen appropriately, we can assume w.l.o.g. that α1
n(1),α2
n(1) ≥
ρ/4 for every n ∈ N.
To prove this claim, we will ﬁnd (i) y0 ∈ F \ ∆ such that d(y0,∆) ≥ ρ2/16 (y0 may be
diﬀerent from y), (ii) some sequence (y0
n)n∈N such that y0
n ∈ Fn and y0
n → y0, and (iii) for







For every n ∈ N let πn be the probability that under (αn(k))k∈N, in the stage of absorp-
tion at least two players play Q.
If for every k ∈ N, αi
n(k) ≥ ρ/4 for at most one player i, then πn < 4 × ρ/4 = ρ. In
particular, it follows that
P3
i=1 yi
n > 4 − 4ρ — a contradiction.
Therefore, for every n ∈ N there is kn ∈ N such that αi
n(kn) ≥ ρ/4 for at least two
players.





n(k) = αn(kn + k − 1). Since (yn(k),αn(k)) is completely absorbing, and by Lemma
3.2, (y0
n(k),α0
n(k)) is completely absorbing as well.
By taking a subsequence, we can assume w.l.o.g. that y0 = limn→∞ y0
n(1) = limn→∞ yn(kn)
exists. Since α0i
n(1) ≥ ρ/4 for at least two players, and since
P3
i=1 y0i
n(2) ≤ 4, it follows that
P3
i=1 y0i
n(1) ≤ 4 − (ρ/4)2, and therefore d(y0,∆) ≥ ρ2/16.
The claim now follows since the number of players is ﬁnite, and the games G are sym-
metric.
9By taking a subsequence, we can assume w.l.o.g. that for every k ∈ N, y(k) = limn→∞ yn(k)




n(1) ≥ ρ/4 for every n ∈ N, α1(1),α2(1) ≥ ρ/4 as well. It follows from
Lemma 3.1(3) that α3(1) > 0. By Lemma 3.4, y(1) < (1,1,1).
Let k > 1 be the ﬁrst stage such that αi(k) = 0 for at least one player i. By Lemma
3.1(2), such a ﬁnite k exists. By Lemma 3.1(3), αi(k) = 0 for at least two players, say 2 and
3. Moreover, by Lemma 3.1(1), yi(k) < 1 for some i.
In particular, it follows that α1(k) 6= 0 (otherwise, α(k) is not an equilibrium in G0(y(k+
1)): player i can proﬁt by quitting). The payoﬀ matrix in Figure 1 implies that y1(k) = 1
and 1 < y3(k). Since there is i such that yi(k) < 1, it follows that y2(k) < 1.
Since α(k) is an equilibrium in G0(y(k + 1)) in which only player 1 quits with positive
probability, it follows that
y
2(k) = (1 − α
1(k))y
2(k + 1) + 3α
1(k), and
y
3(k) = (1 − α
1(k))y
3(k + 1).
In particular, 1 > y2(k) > y2(k + 1), 1 < y3(k) < y3(k + 1), and y1(k) = 1 = y1(k + 1). It
follows that at stage k +1, player 1 is the unique player who quits with positive probability.
Indeed, one can verify that if any other subset of players quit with positive probability, y(k)
cannot be an equilibrium payoﬀ.
Similarly, in any stage l > k, α2(l) = α3(l) = 0 and α1(l) > 0.
For every l ≥ k, α(l) is an equilibrium in G0(y(l + 1)) that yields expected payoﬀ y(l).
It follows that y2(l) ≥ 1 − α1(l). In particular, for every l ≥ k we have α1(l) ≥ 1 − y2(l) ≥
1−y2(k) > 0, hence (y(k),α(k))k∈N is completely absorbing. It follows that y3(k) = 0, hence
player 3 can quit at stage k and proﬁt, contradicting the fact that α(k) is an equilibrium in
G0(y(k + 1)).
Proof of Theorem 2.1: Assume to the contrary that the theorem does not hold. Then
there exists a sequence n → 0 and a sequence (yn)n∈N such that yn ∈ Fn. For every n ∈ N
10let (yn(k),αn(k)) be a completely absorbing admissible sequence for yn in Gn. By Lemma
3.6, we can assume w.l.o.g. that d(yn,∆) < ρ for every n ∈ N, where ρ ∈ (0,1) is arbitrary.
Lemmas 3.3 and 3.6 imply that it cannot be the case that for every n ∈ N there is kn ∈ N
such that αi
n(kn) > 0 for all i. Indeed, otherwise, any accumulation point y of the sequence
yn(kn), as n goes to inﬁnity, is in F. By Lemma 3.3
P3
i=1 yi ≤ 3, which contradicts Lemma
3.6.
Fix n suﬃciently large such that n ∈ (0,(1 − ρ)/3).
We will now show that there is a stage k such that αi
n(k) > 0 for exactly two players. As
discussed above, if n is suﬃciently large then for every k ∈ N there is at least one player i
such that αi
n(k) = 0.
So assume that for every k ∈ N, for at most one player i we have αi
n(k) > 0. Since yn
is not trivial, there is a stage k such that at that stage one player, say player 1, quits with
positive probability. If player 1 is the only player who ever quits with positive probability
under αn, then, since yn is not trivial, y3
n(1) = 0, hence player 3 could have gained by quitting
at stage 1. Hence there is a ﬁrst stage l such that α2
n(l) + α3
n(l) > 0. Since player 1 is the
only player who quits with positive probability until stage l, y1
n(l) = 1 and y3
n(l) > 1, which
implies by the payoﬀ matrix in Figure 1 that α3
n(l) = 0, hence α2
n(l) > 0. However, in this
case player 1 can proﬁt by quitting with probability 1 at stage l, and receiving more than 1.
By Lemma 3.2 we can assume w.l.o.g. that α1
n(1),α2
n(1) > 0, while α3
n(1) = 0. Indeed,
since yn(1) ∈ Fn, yn(k) ∈ Fn as well.
Let m be the minimal integer for which either α1
n(m) = 0, or α2
n(m) = 0, or both. Let
us ﬁrst argue that such a m exists. Otherwise, for every m ∈ N, α1
n(m),α2
n(m) > 0, hence
α3
n(m) = 0. By the payoﬀ matrix in Figure 1, the overall probability that under (αn(m))m∈N
player 1 will ever quit is at most 1/3 (otherwise, player 2 can proﬁt by never quitting). In
particular, for some m, the overall probability that under αn player 1 will ever quit after
stage m is at most n, while the overall probability that player 2 will ever quit after that
stage is 1 (since the sequence is completely absorbing). In particular, player 1 is better of
11by quitting at stage m + 1 with probability 1.
Thus, for every l such that 1 ≤ l < m, we have α1
n(l),α2
n(l) > 0, while α3
n(l) = 0.
Let p = 1 −
Qm−1
l=1 (1 − α2
n(l)) be the overall probability that player 2 quits during the
ﬁrst m − 1 stages, provided player 1 does not quit. Since y1
n(1) > 1, y1
n(m) < 1 + n,
and y1
n(1) = (1 − p)y1
n(m), it follows that p < n/(1 + n) < n. Since d(yn(1),∆) < ρ,
y1
n(1) < 1+n and y2
n(1) < 1, it follows that y3
n(1) > 2−ρ−n. Since p < n, and whenever
player 1 quits player 3 receives at most 1, it follows that y3
n(m) > 2 − ρ − 2n.
So we have asserted that y1
n(m) > 1, y2
n(m) < 1, and y3
n(m) > 2 − ρ − 2n. Let S = {i ∈
{1,2,3} | αi
n(m) > 0}. We will prove that S = ∅.
As already discussed, S 6= {1,2,3}. Since yi
n(m) 6= 1 for every i = 1,2,3, it cannot be
that |S| = 1. By the choice of m, S 6= {1,2}. Since y2
n(m) < 1, S 6= {2,3}. Since y1
n(m) > 1,
S 6= {1,3}.
Thus, S = ∅, and therefore yn(m) = yn(m + 1). Since y2(m) < 1 player 2 can quit at
stage m and proﬁt, contradicting the fact that αn(m) is an equilibrium in Gn(yn(m + 1)).
Sketch of the Proof of Theorem 2.2: Assume to the contrary that for some ﬁxed
 > 0 suﬃciently small, liminfδ→0 d(,δ) < +∞. Then there is K ∈ N and a sequence
δn → 0 such that for every n ∈ N there is a periodic δn-equilibrium in G with period K.
Let (αn(1),...,αn(K)) be the period of the δn-equilibrium, and let (yn(1),...,yn(K)) be the
corresponding sequence of payoﬀs. In particular, αn(k) is an -equilibrium in the one-shot
game G(yn(k + 1)) (addition modulo K), that yields expected payoﬀ yn(k).
By taking a subsequence, we can assume w.l.o.g. that the limits α(k) = limn→∞ αn(k)
and y(k) = limn→∞ yn(k) exist for every k = 1,...,K. By an analogue of Lemma 3.3,
(y(k),α(k))k∈N is an admissible sequence in G0, where for k > K, y(k) = y(k mod K) and
α(k) = α(k mod K).
As in the proof of Lemma 3.6 one can show that y(k) ∈ ∆ for every k ∈ N. A similar
analysis to that done in the proof of Theorem 2.1 leads to a contradiction.
12References
[1] Flesch J., Thuijsman F. and Vrieze K. (1997) Cyclic Markov Equilibria in Stochastic
Games, International Journal of Game Theory, 26, 303-314
[2] Mertens J.F. and Neyman A. (1981) Stochastic Games, International Journal of Game
theory, 10, 53-66
[3] Mertens J.F., Sorin S. and Zamir S. (1994) Repeated Games, Part B, CORE Discussion
Paper 9421
[4] Solan E. (1999) Three-Player Absorbing Games, Mathematics of Operations Research,
24, 669-698
[5] Solan E. (2000) Absorbing Team Games, Games and Economic Behavior, 31, 245-261
[6] Solan E. and Vieille N. (1998) Quitting Games, Mathematics of Operations Research,
to appear
[7] Vieille N. (2000) Equilibrium in 2-Person Stochastic Games II: The Case of Recursive
Games, Israel Journal of Mathematics, forthcoming
[8] Vrieze O.J. and Thuijsman F. (1989) On Equilibria in Repeated Games With Absorbing
States, International Journal of Game Theory, 18, 293-310
13